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Abstract
Practising is a matter of increasing the reliability of ones skills rather than
relying on a tool or a strike of genius to get it right. Once perfection has been
achieved the individual will aim for higher quality since the effort is more likely
to be worthwhile. Furthermore because the returns to achieving perfection are
higher the harder it is to achieve, the perfectionist equilibrium only arises in
situations where genius is rare and reliability is low. From this follows that
as tools improve, even though perfection then has become easier to achieve,
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determined.
Keywords: human capital, skill, technological change, quality, standards,
learning, cultural economics, imperfect competition, patent race
JEL Classification: D2, D43, L13, L15, J24
∗Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge and St John’s College, Cambridge. Email:
SE.Sallstrom@econ.cam.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
‘errare humane est’
It is human to err, but as every aspiring musician knows successful practice makes
perfect.1 However, as every young economist knows, there is an opportunity cost of
time. Is it optimal to aim for perfection? A musician would answer that there is no
choice, since perfection is the standard that is expected and furthermore unless you
have reliable skills it is quite risky to attempt learning to play the repertoire that is
expected.
Classical music is but one example of a profession which is characterized by per-
fection and very high quality of the good that is produced.2 This paper presents a
highly stylized model with both normative and positive results. On the positive side
it explains why
• it is when perfection is very hard to achieve that we tend to observe it in
combination with very high quality, e.g. such as in, conservation, music, and
ballet;3
• professional standards may fall when improved tools become available, e.g. such
as computers and the presence of typos, or power drills and skew screws;4
• why some highly skilled professions may die out when the opportunity cost of
time goes up.
On the normative side it addresses when perfectionism is desirable and whether the
individual incentives are biased in equilibrium.
1To practice need not necessarily be a successful endeavor. Spending hours playing scales without
the right articulation will achieve nothing and might even be damaging.
2Quality and professional standards are being used interchangeably throughout the paper.
3These professions are often also characterised by the superstar phenomenon (see Rosen (1981)).
4This is an example of the effect described by Chamberlin (1953) in his paper about the product
as a variable. He provided several examples of when new technology resulted in lower quality.
Sa¨llstro¨m (1999) showed that this effect was present in a monopoly with heterogeneous consumers.
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The intuition for the positive results are as follows.
If there are professionals around with reliable skills, you will have to match the
professional standards they set if you wish to compete with them. If the chances
are small an individual can manage without reliable skills, it will be optimal for the
individual to aim for perfection as well and only compete if successful in achieving
it. Furthermore if perfectionists only expect there to be competition from others who
managed to achieve perfection, they will aim for higher professional standards than
they would in a situation where there are enthusiasts around giving it a go even if
they do not have the skills that enable perfection.
When improved tools become available the profession may change from a perfec-
tionist equilibrium to a lazy equilibrium in which nobody aims for perfection and
instead relies on the tools to get it right. Even though the tool has made it easier to
achieve perfection, by being a substitute for skills it has weakened the incentive to
acquire the skills. As a result professional standards may fall. An illustrative exam-
ple is the number of typos in printed books compared with say fifty years ago, where
individuals rely on computer software rather than acquiring the skill of typewriting
and proof reading.
When the opportunity cost of time increases, the perfectionist equilibrium may
cease to exist when genius is rare and reliability is low. Examples of this effect can be
found for some highly skilled crafts, where unless reliable skills are acquired it is not
worthwhile even trying. Hence, if nobody has invested the time to achieve perfection,
there will be no one out there who can do it any more.
These effects arise when the accumulation of human capital and the production
process both entail an element of risk of failure, which is a characteristic feature of
creative industries as noted by Caves (2003). Spending hours practising is a way of
trying to eliminate this risk in making ones skills more reliable. However, spending
hours practising is risky as well since there is no guarantee the individual will be
successful in achieving perfection despite the practice. In some cases it will also take
longer to realise you are not going to make it, than in other cases. For example it
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takes ten years to learn to play the piano. But unless you spend the time you will
never learn whether practice would have helped. Anyone is allowed to try to meet
the standards of the profession, but those who have practiced and been successful in
increasing their reliability are more likely to succeed in meeting any standards and
will therefore have incentives to aim for higher quality.
The game between e.g. aspiring musicians, can be modelled as a patent race5
between two independent producers with three important additions. First, there is
a risky option to accumulate human capital, which if successful will eliminate the
risk of the production process. Second, the quality of the output is endogenised
too. It is chosen after the individual has had the opportunity to try to improve
the reliability of the production process, but before the individual learns about his
competitors achievements or failures. Third, the risk depends both on strike of genius
and reliability of skills. The less reliable the more time it takes before perfection can
be achieved if ever. Those who have been successful in meeting the same professional
standards then compete a la Cournot.
Perfectionism is an important element in the history of moral thought from Plato
and Aristotle through Spinoza and Hegel, the Aristotelian thesis being that ‘devel-
oping human nature fulfils our function or purpose as humans’. The perfection con-
sidered in this paper is a combination of Hurka’s (1993) list of human excellences:
physical perfection, theoretical rationality and practical rationality, since in most pro-
fessions skills that make a process more reliable will be a combination of the physical,
intellectual and practical capabilities of a human being. It is precisely because either
of these may be limiting that individuals can not be certain of achieving perfection
even if they try.
I am not aware of any formal model which addresses the problem of risky human
capital and its relation to risky technology and quality of output.6 It is, however,
5See Reinganum’s (1989) masterful survey of patent races and the timing of innovation.
6The literature on human capital has dealt with situations where individuals choose how much to
invest in human capital when they will actually get it. For example as in endogenous growth models
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very prevalent in creative industries, and is one of the factors which makes these
industries distinct from other industries. In his excellent review article on contracts
between art and commerce Caves (2003) noted that this is an area in great need of
analytical models. The only models that have been done so far have been related to
the nature of the contracts. This paper therefore fits in nicely by looking at one of the
sunk costs that has only been addressed verbally so far. The model in this paper also
has wider applicability since the parameter in the model that in the case of artistic
professions represents genius, would in other professions represent the reliability of
the tools. Since genius is a gift of nature, whereas tools can be improved, the model
furthermore explains why perfection has remained an equilibrium in e.g. classical
music, but ceased to be in e.g. the building industry.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The model is outlined in section 2 followed
by an analysis of professional standards. In this section more detailed results are
presented for how quality depends on expectations about strategies played by others,
and how genius and reliability influence the level. In Section 3 I characterise and
derive conditions under which the perfectionist, enthusiastic and lazy equilibrium
will exist. This section also contains a numerical example of the effect of improved
tools on professional standards and the equilibrium. Section 4 derives the welfare for
the different equilibria, and shows when the private and social incentives coincide.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the assumptions in Section 5.
2 The Model
Consider two individuals who are making decisions about how to prepare themselves
for and whether to pursue a career in e.g. music.
Let γ be the probability that the effort results in the intended outcome. It depends
such as in Romer(1990), or in empirical work such as Black and Lynch (1996), who estimated the
productivity gains from investment in human capital.
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on the prior probability that you can rely on a tool or genius to get it right α,7 and
when genius does not strike the reliability ex ante β ∈ [0, 1].8 The prior probability
that putting in the effort will be worthwhile is
γ = α+ (1− α)β. (1)
The timing of the game is as follows. The first choice the individual has to make
is whether or not to try to achieve perfection by practising and putting in the effort
required to fill the gap, e = 1− β. The chances of being successful in this endeavour
are γ, and the cost of the effort is ke2. The posterior reliability if the individual
attempts to achieve perfection by putting in effort e1 = 1− β is,
γ1 =
 1 if success,β if failure. (2)
If an individual is successful in achieving perfection she knows she can rely on her skills
to a hundred percent. Her posterior probability of a strike of genius is α1 =
α
α+(1−α)β ,
and the reliability of her skills β + e1 = 1. If she fails improving the reliability of her
skills despite having practiced, she has learnt she is definitely not a genius or that
she cannot rely on her tools to get it right, e.g. the posterior probability of genius is
α1 = 0, but that she still can succeed with probability β in successfully completing
the task.
The second choice is whether or not to pursue a career and if yes what quality s
to aim for. Up until this point all actions, and results remain private information.
If the individual puts in effort e2 = s it will materialise in s with probability γ1. If
the individual is successful in achieving s, it becomes public information, e.g. once
you are ready to give a concert your competitors will know it. At this stage those
7The parameter α measures the relative importance of tools or genius, versus skills in getting
it right. Hence, with a self-correcting tool, α would be high. For example if your word processor
automatically corrects for typos, being a skillful typist has lower returns.
8Note that β also is a measure of how hard it is to achieve perfection. The smaller is β the harder
it is.
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who have been successful in achieving the same standard s compete a la Cournot,
e.g. decide on how many concert tickets to make available.
Since there are only two players, for analytical convenience, someone who has been
successful in learning to play e.g. Rachmaninov’s second piano concerto, will either
be in a monopoly position or in a duopoly position. If the demand for quality takes
the standard Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) form e.g.
θs − p, and the taste parameter θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the maximized
revenue for the monopoly and duopoly cases can be written as follows,9
RM =
V s
4
, (3)
RD =
V s
9
, (4)
where V reflects the returns to quality in the market. For these standard preferences
the revenue will be linear in quality of the good or service provided.
The expected payoff when choosing the professional standard s depends on expec-
tations about the strategy employed by the other player.
There are three possible strategies.
1. Lazy, no practice, relies on genius and good luck in pursuing the career.
2. Perfectionist, practices hard and will only pursue a career if perfection is achieved.
3. Enthusiast, practices hard and pursues the career regardless.
The probability of facing competition in the final period is γ if the other player
plays L or P and γ + (1− γ)β if the other one plays E. Hence, the expected payoff
if successful in delivering s is
γ
V s
9
+ (1− γ)V s
4
=
9− 5γ
36
V s (5)
if the other player is lazy or a perfectionist, and
(γ + (1− γ)β)V s
9
+ (1− γ)(1− β)V s
4
=
9− 5(γ + (1− γ)β)
36
V s (6)
9In this case the revenue from a concert will be maximized for maxθ V θs(1 − θ) which gives
revenues RM = V s4 , etc.
7
if the other player is an enthusiast.
2.1 Professional standards
The professional standards, i.e. the quality that is expected, are set by those who
have reliable skills unless nobody is expected to have reliable skills in equilibrium in
which case the ’lazy’ sets the standard.
An individual with reliable skills will choose the quality to maximise the expected
payoff. Note that since reliable skills means that there is no risk that these standards
will not be met, the individual maximises
sP = argmax
(
9− 5γ
36
)
V sP − ks2P (7)
if she expects the competitors to be either lazy or perfectionists. The optimal standard
in this case is
s∗P =
9− 5γ
36
V
2k
, (8)
taking the first derivative with respect to α gives
∂sP
∂α
= −5(1− β)
36
V
2k
(9)
which is negative. The first derivative with respect to β is
∂sP
∂β
= −5(1− α)
36
V
2k
(10)
which is also negative. The professional standards will be higher the harder it is to
achieve due to genius being rare and/or the task being intrinsically difficult. This is
because having achieved it makes it more likely the individual will be unique in which
case there will be higher returns to the quality of the output. There is no positive
effect from neither α nor β. This is because, once perfection has been achieved, their
only role is to determine to what extent others might have been able to achieve the
same. The reliability influences the cost of practising, but this is a sunk cost and
will therefore not matter for the quality later on. Similarly genius α will increase
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the chances that the individual will achieve perfection, but once perfection has been
achieved, it becomes irrelevant, since with reliable skills the individual no longer has
to rely on a strike of genius to get it right.
If the individual expects competition from an enthusiast, she chooses
sE = argmax
9− 5(γ + (1− γ)β)
36
V sE − ks2E. (11)
The optimal standard in this case is
s∗E =
9− 5(γ + (1− γ)β)
36
V
2k
, (12)
which is less than when faced with competition from a perfectionist. If faced with
competition from someone who will give it a go, regardless of whether they have
reliable skills to meet the quality standards, it is optimal for someone who has reliable
skills to set lower standards. This is because it is more likely she would be faced with
competition, and therefore returns to quality will be lower.
Since (γ + (1− γ)β) = α+ (1− α)β(2− β), the first derivative with respect to α
can be written,
∂sE
∂α
= −5(1− β(2− β))
36
V
2k
. (13)
It will be negative but smaller in magnitude than if the individual expected compe-
tition from a perfectionist. The first derivative with respect to β is
∂sE
∂β
= −5(1− α)2(1− β)
36
V
2k
. (14)
Again the effect is negative, but in this case it is larger in magnitude than when
competition is expected from a perfectionist.
The increased chance that others may have genius as well has a greater negative
effect on quality when the individual expects competition from a perfectionist (or a
lazy individual) than when she expects competition from an enthusiast. Whereas,
the task being more difficult (lower β) has a greater positive effect on quality if the
individual expects competition from an enthusiast, than from a perfectionist. This
is because there is an additional effect from β if the individual expects competition
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from an enthusiast, since β is also the posterior probability γ1 for those who failed
and thus the likelihood they will show up at the final stage.
These standards have to be matched by someone who decides to pursue a career,
unless we have a lazy equilibrium in which nobody attempts to acquire reliable skills.
In an equilibrium where everybody plays the lazy strategy and expects everybody
else to play the lazy strategy as well, the professional standards solve
sL = argmax γ
(
9− 5γ
36
)
V sL − ks2L. (15)
The professional standards when nobody attempts to achieve perfection will be
s∗L = γ
9− 5γ
36
V
2k
= γs∗P . (16)
The fact that an individual who employs a lazy strategy will only be successful in
delivering s with probability γ if he puts in an effort e2 = s, implies he will not aim
as high as an individual with reliable skills would.
The first derivative with respect to γ is
∂s∗L
∂γ
=
9− 10γ
36
V
2k
. (17)
The lazy standard is increasing in α and β reaching a maximum at γ = 9
10
, and
decreases thereafter. Hence, it is only when the chances of succeeding are very high
that the standards start falling for an even higher γ. This is because there are two
effects. The first one is that a higher γ implies it is more likely the effort will be
worthwhile which has a positive effect on quality. The second is that a higher γ
implies that it is more likely other people will have been successful as well, which has
a negative effect.
The professional standards converge as γ → 1. A higher γ implies that there is
less to be gained from becoming a perfectionist relative to those who are not, and
furthermore it is less likely that one would be able to enjoy a monopoly position if
successful.
It is noteworthy that an individual who has achieved perfection will aim for lower
professional standards if she expects the other player to be an enthusiast rather than
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lazy or a perfectionist. The reason for this is that both the perfectionist and a lazy
person are less likely to show up and compete in the final period than the enthusiast.
Note that since, sL = γsP , it is easily verified that the standards in a lazy equilib-
rium are strictly less than those that an individual with reliable skills would set. The
question is whether the professional standards when there are enthusiasts around are
ever going to be lower than the standards that will be chosen when everybody is lazy.
Hence is sE > sL? This is true if
9− 5(γ + (1− γ)β)
36
V
2k
> γ
9− 5γ
36
V
2k
. (18)
Simplifying and collecting terms
(1− γ)(9− 5γ) > 5(1− γ)β (19)
substituting for γ = α+ (1− α)β we get
α(1− β) + 2β < 9
5
(20)
which is not satisfied for β close to one. When perfection in skills makes a very
small difference, quality will be higher in a lazy equilibrium than in an enthusiastic
equilibrium. In the enthusiastic equilibrium people have on average more reliable
skills, but they also face more competition, and the latter effect dominates when β is
high.
Another interesting observation is how the difference in standards between the
perfectionist equilibrium and the enthusiastic equilibrium varies with α and β.
sP − sE = 5(1− γ)β
36
V
2k
=
5(1− α)(1− β)β
36
V
2k
(21)
The difference is decreasing in α, whereas for β < 1
2
it is increasing and for β > 1/2
it is decreasing, reaching a maximum for β = 1/2. When β is very small there is
hardly any difference in level of competition in the final period for the two strategies,
and standards will therefore be very similar. If β is very high, it is not very likely an
enthusiast would fail, and therefore it makes very little difference that he would give
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it a go even if he failed. It is when β is in the intermediate range, that the difference
is most marked.
To sum up. Quality is the highest and will be delivered with certainty if everybody
is a perfectionist. When individuals are enthusiasts, the quality will be slightly lower,
and there is a chance it will not be delivered. Quality is the lowest, and the failure
rate the highest when individuals are lazy, unless genius is very common and/or tasks
are easy, in which case quality will be higher than in the enthusiastic equilibrium.
However, reliability will still be lower.
Thus the quality, as well as the reliability with which it is delivered will depend
on which strategies are employed in equilibrium.
3 Pure Strategy Equilibria
There are three possible symmetric pure strategy equilibria in the model. In this
section I analyse their properties and conditions under which they will exist.
3.1 Perfectionist
In the perfectionist equilibrium individuals aim for perfection and only pursue their
careers if they achieve perfection. The equilibrium standards are
sP =
9− 5γ
36
V
2k
, (22)
with equilibrium payoff
Π∗(P, P ) = γ
(
9− 5γ
36
)2 V 2
4k
− k(1− β)2 = k
(
γs2P − (1− β)2
)
. (23)
The first γ is the probability that the individual will succeed in achieving perfection
in which case she will also succeed in delivering a good of quality sP with probability
one. However, the cost of practising k(1−β)2 will be incurred regardless. This payoff
is positive if,
s2P >
(1− β)2
γ
. (24)
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This condition will be satisifed as long as the returns to quality V are sufficiently
high relative to the opportunity cost of time k. Hence, if k increases at a higher
rate than V this condition may no longer be satisfied. This is precisely the problem
faced in some highly skilled crafts where the higher opportunity cost of time has not
been matched by a corresponding increase in the returns to quality, implying that
the expected payoff from a perfectionist strategy is negative.
The next question is how does the profit vary with genius and difficulty of the
task? Taking the first derivative of the equilibrium profit with respect to α gives
∂Π
∂α
= ksP
[
(1− β)sP + γ2∂sP
∂α
]
(25)
=
(1− β)V
72
sP [9− 15γ] . (26)
The profit will be increasing in α as long as γ < 9
15
. After that it will be decreas-
ing. There are two effects from genius. The first is that it increases the chances of
being able to achieve perfection, which has a positive effect. the second it that it
also increases the chance somebody else will have achieved perfection as well, thus
competition becaomes more likely which has a negative effect. For α sufficiently small
the first effect dominates.
∂Π
∂β
= k
[
(1− β)s2P + γ2sP
∂sP
∂β
+ 2(1− β)
]
(27)
=
(1− α)V
72
sP [9− 15γ] + 2k(1− β). (28)
Since β plays two roles, there will be an additional positive effect since a higher β
lowers the effort needed to achieve perfection.
When the expected payoff is positive there exists parameter values under which it
will indeed be an equilibrium. It is an equilibrium if it is neither profitable to deviate
by employing the enthusiastic strategy nor the lazy one if the individual expects the
other player to play the perfectionist strategy of a perfectionist equilibrium.
First, an individual who tried but failed in the first period should not wish to
continue in the second period
β
(
9− 5γ
36
V sP
)
− ks2P < 0. (29)
13
This can be written
(2β − 1)ks2P < 0. (30)
The enthusiastic strategy would result in a negative payoff if the standards are those
of a perfectionist equilibrium if β < 1/2. Thus if the task is sufficiently difficult there
is no incentive to deviate in period two. A player who plays the enthusiastic strategy
is better informed about his true chances to succeed in delivering s, than someone
who plays the lazy. If he succeeded he will get a higher payoff than a lazy, whereas if
he failed his expected payoff will be lower. Hence, a lazy individual is more likely to
give it a go than an enthusiast who failed.
Second, trying to achieve sP with no practice should result in a lower expected
payoff than playing the perfectionist strategy. The payoff from the lazy strategy if
the other player plays the perfectionist strategy is
Π(LP ) = γ
(
9− 5γ
36
)
V sP − ks2P = (2γ − 1)ks2P . (31)
Since this strategy gives a negative payoff for γ < 1/2, there is no incentive to deviate
by being lazy when genius is rare and reliability is low. To see this one can solve for
β which gives
β <
[
1
2
− α
]
1
1− α. (32)
It can be confirmed that this is indeed a more stringent condition on β than (30),
since the right hand side is less than 1/2 for α > 0. Here we see that it is when genius
is rare, i.e. α is small, that there is no incentive whatsoever for an individual to play
the lazy strategy, provided that the task is sufficiently difficult, i.e. β is small enough.
Furthermore the lazy strategy does not only give less in expectation from the point
of view of period two, but also from the point of view of the entire game. Comparing
the expected payoff Π(EP ) < Π(LP ) one gets
(2β − 1)ks2P < (2γ − 1)ks2P . (33)
If there is no incentive to deviate by being lazy, there certainly will not be an incentive
to deviate by being an enthusiast either.
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Condition (32) is a sufficient condition for there to be a perfectionist equilibrium.
For γ > 1/2 there may still be an equilibrium provided that Π(PP ) > Π(LP ), i.e.
γks2P − k(1− β)2 > (2γ − 1)ks2P (34)
Since 1− γ = (1− α)(1− β) this condition can be written
s2P >
1− β
1− α (35)
e.g. the perfectionist equilibrium quality has to be higher than the ratio of difficulty
of the task (1− β) to how much the individual relies on having reliable skills (1−α).
The left hand side is decreasing in α and β whereas the right hand side is increasing in
α and decreasing in β. If α goes up the condition is less likely to be satisfied, whereas
if β goes up the effect is ambiguous. A higher α implies that the relative importance
of having reliable skills decreases. For example, having type writing skills become
relatively less important when the individual no longer has to use a typewriter but
can rely on computer software. In this case it is less likely people will acquire the
skills, since they cost the same, but even though they increase the chances of a perfect
outcome, it can be achieved without them. Hence, perfection is a strategy that arises,
in situations where it is not very likely you will get it right unless you have reliable
skills.
Finally the individual should not get a higher payoff by doing nothing, i.e. the
equilibrium payoff has to be positive for it to be an equilibrium. On this account
comparing (29) and (35) reveals that if genius is rare
α <
1− 2β
2(1− β) (36)
it will not be profitable to deviate by being lazy when the payoff in the perfectionist
equilibrium is positive. It should be noted that this is the same condition as (32).
Thus when genius is rare and perfection is difficult to achieve, there will be a
perfectionist equilibrium if the expected payoff in equilibrium is positive.
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Condition (35) can also be rewritten in a form that is intuitively appealing.
Namely
γ < 1−
(
e1
sP
)2
(37)
The probability of succeeding has to be smaller than one minus the ratio of first to
second period effort squared. If the effort required to achieve perfection is higher
than the effort required to meet the professional standards, this condition can not be
satisfied for any γ. It is a necessary condition that effort increases over time, e1 < e2,
since e2 = sP . .
This is equivalent to requiring that
1− β < 9− 5γ
36
V
2k
. (38)
If the ratio between the parameters V and k is high enough, V
k
> 72
5
, we have the
following result. If
α > 1− 72k
5V
(39)
the effort will increase if β is high enough, since (38) can then be written
β >
72k − V (9− 5α)
72k − 5V (1− α) . (40)
Note that the right hand side is less than one. Whereas for
α < 1− 72k
5V
(41)
the effort will increase if
β <
V (9− 5α)− 72k
5V (1− α)− 72k (42)
which is trivially satisfied since the right hand side is greater than one.
Hence if α is high, β has to be high enough for effort to increase over time.
Whereas if α is small, effort will increase over time regardless of β. This result occurs
when the marginal returns to quality V are high enough relative to the opportunity
cost of time k.
To sum up. The perfectionist equilibrium arises when reliability is low and genius
is rare. For example condition (36) reveals that if β = 1/3, α < 1/4. If either genius
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is common or tasks are not too difficult, the individual would have an incentive to
deviate and play the lazy strategy instead.
The questions is whether there is ever an enthusiastic equilibrium, in which people
try to achieve perfection and keep on going even if they fail.
3.2 Enthusiast
If there is an enthusiastic equilibrium everybody tries to achieve perfection. Those
who succeed set the standard expecting competition also from those who failed.
The equilibrium standard is
sE =
(
9− 5(γ + (1− γ)β)
36
)
V
2k
(43)
with expected equilibrium payoff
Π∗(E,E) = (γ + (1− γ)β)
(
9− 5(γ + (1− γ)β)
36
)2
V 2
4k
− k(1− β)2 (44)
= (γ + (1− γ)β)ks2E − k(1− β)2 (45)
This payoff is positive if
s2E >
(1− β)2
α+ (1− α)β(2− β) . (46)
Taking the first derivative with respect to α gives
∂ΠE
∂α
=
(1− β)2V
72
sE [9− 30(γ + (1− γ)β)] . (47)
There is the same trade off as in the perfectionist equilibrium, however, the compet-
itive effect will dominate earlier, since there is more competition in the enthusiastic
equilibrium. For β one gets
∂ΠE
∂β
=
(1− β)(1− α)V
36
sE [9− 15(γ + (1− γ)β)] + 2k(1− β). (48)
This is an equilibrium if it is optimal to stay in for someone who attempted to
achieve perfection but failed. Hence, the perfectionist strategy gives a lower payoff if
β
(
9− 5(γ + (1− γ)β)
36
)2
V 2
2k
− ks2E > 0. (49)
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Thus the enthusiastic equilibrium requires β > 1/2.
Furthermore, it should not be possible for a lazy individual to get a higher payoff
in this equilibrium. The payoff to a lazy individual is,
γ
(
9− 5(γ + (1− γ)β)
36
)2
V 2
2k
− ks2E = (2γ − 1)ks2E (50)
This payoff will be positive for β > 1/2, since this implies γ > 1/2. Hence we need
to compare it with the expected payoff from the enthusiastic strategy,
(γ + (1− γ)β)ks2E − k(1− β)2 > (2γ − 1)ks2E (51)
this equivalent to
(1− γ)(1 + β)ks2E > k(1− β)2 (52)
which can be written,
s2E >
1− β
(1− α)(1 + β) . (53)
This condition is interesting. The left hand side is decreasing in α and β, whereas the
right hand side is decreasing in β but increasing in α. Hence, the condition is more
likely to be satisfied if α is small, since the professional standards are then going to
be higher. Hence the enthusiastic equilibrium is more likely to arise when genius is
rare and tasks are not too difficult.
If condition (53) is satisfied, the individual will also enjoy a positive payoff in
equilibrium. We can see this by noting that
1− β
(1− α)(1 + β) >
(1− β)2
α+ (1− α)β(2− β) (54)
which can be simplified to α+(2β− 1)(1−α) hence it is trivially satisfied for β > 1
2
.
This implies that there are instances where the expected revenue in the enthusiastic
equilibrium is higher than the cost of practising, but it is not sufficient for it to be
an equilibrium. This stands in sharp contrast to the perfectionist equilibrium which
under conditions when genius is rare and tasks are difficult will exist provided that
the expected revenue is higher than the cost of practising.
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When α is low we have a situation where skills are important to get it right.
Depending on how reliable those skills are ex ante there will be a perfectionist equi-
librium if reliability is low, such as in classical music, and an enthusiastic equilibrium
when reliability is medium to high.
If α is high, professional standards would be lower in both the perfectionist and
the enthusiastic equilibrium, which would make it less costly for a lazy individual
to match those and give it a go without practising. Hence, there will then be an
incentive to deviate by being lazy.
3.3 Lazy
Now, consider the lazy equilibrium where standards are set by a lazy individual
who does not expect anyone to aim for perfection in their skills. In this case the
professional standards are
sL = γ
(
9− 5γ
36
)
V
2k
(55)
which gives equilibrium payoff
Π∗(LL) = γ2
(
9− 5γ
36
)2 V 2
4k
= ks2L. (56)
Here the expected payoff is always positive, since the standards are chosen to maximise
this payoff and there is no cost of practising. Thus there is no sunk cost in this case.
Furthermore it has the same maximum as sL, i.e. it is increasing for α and β for
γ < 9/10. Hence, it reaches a maximum later than the perfectionist equilibrium.
This is an equilibrium if neither the perfectionist nor the enthusiastic strategy
would in expectation give a higher payoff. Hence, Π(LL) > Π(PL),
ks2L > γ
(
9− 5γ
36
V sL − ks2L
)
− k(1− β)2 (57)
simplifying this gives
ks2L > γ(2− γ)sL
9− 5γ
36
V
2
− k(1− β)2 (58)
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simplifying further
s2L <
1− β
1− α. (59)
Note that even though the probability that a lazy individual and a perfectionist
would show up in the end game, their payoffs will be different. This is because the
perfectionist will only incur a cost for sL if successful in achieving perfection, whereas
the lazy will save on not having tried to achieve perfection.10 The saving to the
perfectionist will be lower the lower is sL, whereas the saving to the lazy will be
higher the smaller is β.
Second, we need to check that Π(LL) > Π(EL),
ks2L > (γ + (1− γ)β)
(
9− 5γ
36
V sL
)
− ks2L − k(1− β)2 (60)
simplifying
γ(1− β)
2(1− α)β > s
2
L. (61)
This is a less stringent condition than (59) if
γ(1− β)
2(1− α)β >
1− β
1− α (62)
simplifying
α >
β
1− β (63)
Hence, if α is high enough, then if it is not profitable for a perfectionist to deviate it
will not be for an enthusiast either.
Condition (59) can alternatively be written
γ > 1−
(
e1
sL
)2
. (64)
10Note that we have made the implicit assumption that the professional standards define the
quality that people expect. This has two implications. First, as long as it is met there will neither
be any complaints nor any money back issues. Second, there will not be any rewards to doing
more. Hence, if the lazy equilibrium prevails, a perfectionist has nothing to gain, other than his own
self-esteem, aiming for more than sL.
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This condition is trivially satisfied if the effort required to achieve perfection is higher
than the effort required to meet the standards in the lazy equilibrium. If the reverse
is true, it is required that γ is high enough. This is an intuitive result. If it is more
costly to improve ones skills than just giving it ago, there are no incentives to practice.
However, the higher the effort required to meet the professional standards relative
to the effort required to achieve perfection, the higher the returns to being able to
deliver reliably.
It should also be noted that for
s2L <
1− β
1− α < s
2
P (65)
both the perfectionist and the lazy strategy are Nash equilibria. It then depends on
what people expect which equilibrium will prevail.
We shall conclude this section by looking at a numerical example to illustrate the
results.
Consider at first α = β = 1
4
. For these parameter the standards in a perfectionist
equilibrium would be
sP (
7
16
) =
109
4262
V
2k
. (66)
There exists a perfectionist equilibrium if (35) is satisfied, i.e.(
109
4262
V
2k
)2
> 1. (67)
This will be satisfied provided that V/k is high enough. Let Πi(γ) denote the equi-
librium payoff in equilibrium i. Then
ΠP (
7
16
) =
7
16
(
109
4262
)2 V 2
4k
− k 9
16
(68)
Now suppose that the tools are improved so that α = 1
2
, whereas β remains at 1
4
.
Then the standards that would prevail in the two candidate equilibria would be
sP (
5
8
) =
47
8 · 62
V
2k
, (69)
sL(
5
8
) =
5
8
47
8 · 62
V
2k
. (70)
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The perfectionist equilibrium will no loger exist if (35) is no longer satisifed, i.e.(
94
4262
V
2k
)2
<
3
2
. (71)
This will be satisfied provided that V/k is not too high. Hence, there will be a move
from a perfectionist to a lazy equilibrium for a range of parameter values if the lower
and upper bounds are compatible. The lower bound on V/k in (67) is less than the
upperbound in (71) if (
94
109
)2
<
3
2
, (72)
which is indeed satisifed.
The quality and reliability falls when we move from a perfectionist equilibrium to
a lazy equilibrium due to an increase in α,
sP (
7
16
)− sL(5
8
) =
[
4 · 109− 5 · 47
8262
]
V
2k
> 0 (73)
Note that this is true in general since sP is decreasing α. Thus for any α
′′ > α′ we
have that sL(α
′′) = γsP (α′′) < sP (α′′) < sP (α′).
Improved tools will result in lower professional standards regardless of whether
the equilibrium changes from perfectionist to lazy or not. However, the reduction will
be even larger and reliability, of those who try to produce the good, lower if there is a
switch to a lazy equilibrium. However, the a priori chances the good will be delivered
at all have increased from γ = 7
16
to γ = 5
8
.
The expected equilibrium payoff in the lazy equilibrium is
ΠL(
5
8
) =
25
64
(
47
8 · 62
)2 V 2
4k
(74)
This payoff is higher than the individual got in the perfectionist equilibrium with a
lower α. To see this note that if the expected payoff in the perfectionist equilibrium
was higher, the following would have to be true.(
V
k
)2
>
36(4262)2
7(109)2 − 25
4
(94)2
(75)
However, the right hand side exceeds the upper bound on V/k. Hence, the individual
payoff cannot be higher in the perfectionist equilibrium if it changes to a lazy.
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This example has illustrated that if the returns to quality relative to opportunity
cost of time are high but not too high, a profession that used to be characterised by
a perfectionist equilibrium may switch to a lazy equilibrium when tools improve.
Even though the chances of being successful in achieving perfection have improved,
standards will fall. Thus when tools improve, such as typewriters being replaced by
computers. Several things will happen. It is then more likely to succeed without
reliable skills, which lowers the return to practising to make ones skills more reliable.
As a result the professions may move from a perfectionist equilibrium, in which only
those with type writing skills would prepare manuscripts to a lazy equilibrium in
which everybody relies on the software to get it right. The result being that there are
more typos in printed work, i.e. professional standards have fallen, but more people
are actually doing it.
4 Welfare
Is the perfectionist equilibrium socially desirable? And are the individual incentives
biased?
The expected welfare of the game is the probability that either of the two players
end up in a monopoly position, in which case the welfare is given by,
WM =
∫ 1
θM
V sθdθ =
3
8
V s (76)
plus the probability that they compete a la Cournot, in which case the welfare is
WC =
∫ 1
θC
V sθdθ =
4
9
V s (77)
From this we can infer that the consumers’ surplus is
SM = WM − ΠM = 1
8
V s (78)
SC = WC − 2ΠC = 2
9
V s. (79)
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Total welfare for the three equilibria is as follows:
W (PP ) =
[
γ2
4
9
+ 2γ(1− γ)3
8
]
V sP − 2k
[
γs2P + (1− β)2
]
= γ
V 2
4k
(
1− 1
3
γ
)(
9− 5γ
36
)
− 2k(1− β)2 (80)
W (LL) =
[
γ2
4
9
+ 2γ(1− γ)3
8
]
V sL − 2ks2L = γ2
V 2
4k
(
1− 1
3
γ
)(
9− 5γ
36
)
W (EE) =
[
γ2
4
9
+ 2γ(1− γ)3
8
+ (1− γ)2
(
β2
4
9
+ 2(1− β)β 3
8
)]
V sE − 2k
[
(1− β)2 + s2E
]
=
V 2
72k
[γ(32− 11γ) + (1− γ)β [(1− γ)(27− 11β) + 5]− 9]
(
9− 5(γ + (1− γ)β)
36
)
−2k(1− β)2 (81)
The perfectionist equilibrium generates a higher welfare than the lazy equilibrium
if [
γ2
4
9
+ 2γ(1− γ)3
8
]
V [sP − sL] > 2k
[
γs2P + (1− β)2 − s2L
]
(82)
hence, if the expected welfare gain from higher quality is larger than the expected
increment in costs. This can alternatively be written
γ(1− γ)V
2
4k
(
1− 1
3
γ
)(
9− 5γ
36
)
> 2k(1− β)2. (83)
The difference in the expected value of what is produced in the perfectionist and lazy
equilibrium respectively has to be higher than the sunk cost to the individuals which
is incurred when they practice. The sunk cost is times two, since both individuals
practice in the perfectionist equilibrium.
This condition allows us to make two observations. First, comparing with the
difference in equilibrium payoff between the perfectionist and the lazy equilibrium
γ(1− γ)V
2
4k
(
9− 5γ
36
)2
> k(1− β)2, (84)
one can show that from a welfare point of view the perfectionist equilibria will be
preferable tp the lazy for a larger range of parameter values than from the individuals
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point of view. Hence, at a point when the individual would be better off in the lazy
equilibrium due to the cost of practice, it would be better from a welfare point of
view if he did not switch.
Second, whether or not the individual switches depends on whether the lazy strat-
egy would give a higher payoff if the other palyes plays the perfectionist strategy.
Rearranging terms this can be written in a form similar to (35),
γ
(
3− γ
6
)(
9− 5γ
36
)
V 2
4k2
>
1− β
1− α. (85)
When β < 1/2, there is either a perfectionist or a lazy equilibrium. Social and private
incentives for perfection coincide if
γ
(
3− γ
6
)(
9− 5γ
36
)
V 2
4k2
=
(
9− 5γ
36
)2 V 2
4k2
(86)
which can be simplified to
γ2 − 23
6
γ +
3
2
= 0. (87)
This equation has two roots. The positive one can be ruled out since it is outside the
domain of γ. The negative root is
γ˜ =
23−√313
12
≈ 1
2
. (88)
For γ < γ˜ the social incentive is stronger than the private, i.e. genie oblige and for
γ > γ˜ the social incentive is weaker, i.e. the best is the enemy of the good.
Is the perfectionist equilibrium ever preferable to the enthusiastic equilibrium?
γ
54− 22γ
72
V [sP − sE] + 2k[s2E − γs2P ]− (1− γ)2
(
54− 22β
72
)
βV sE > 0 (89)
First effect is the higher quality in the perfectionist equilibrium. Second effect is the
difference in cost. Third effect is the fact that there will be some production of the
good even if the individuals fail in achieving perfection.
The first effect is positive. The second effect is positive if s2E − γs2P which is true
if
(1− γ)[(9− 5γ)[9− 5α(1− β)− 15β] + 25β2(1− γ)] > 0 (90)
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This condition is satisfied as long as β is not too close to one. Hence, the more re-
liable production will compensate for the higher cost of quality in the perfectionist
equilibrium as long as reliability is not too high a priori. The third effect is how-
ever negative, since it is the welfare gain from having the good materialising more
frequently thanks to the enthusiasm of those who failed. Hence, it depends on which
effect dominates.
The enthusiastic equilibrium has a higher expected payoff ifW (EE)−W (LL) > 0,
(sE−sL)
[
γV
(
3
4
− 11
36
γ
)
− 2k(sE + sL)
]
+(1−γ)2
(
β2
4
9
+ 2(1− β)β 3
8
)
V sE−2k(1−β)2.
(91)
5 Conclusion
This paper has answered the question why perfection tends to happen when it is hard
and rare to be able to achieve. Furthermore, by answering this it has also provided
a rationale for changes in terms of to what extent individuals aim for perfection in
their skills and the standards of quality they aim for as professionals, and finally to
what extent a highly skilled profession remains or ceases to exist.
The results were derived in a highly stylized model, which the author believes to
be the simplest representation of the intuition behind the results. In this concluding
section the various assumptions will be discussed in turn.
The assumption that the individual faces the same opportunity cost of time when
acquiring skills as when working is not crucial for the result. Different costs here
would only add complexity to the model without changing the results. Quadratic
opportunity cost of time is the reason why we get critical values of one half. It does
not affect the qualitative results. The assumption that the probability of being able
to achieve perfection in skills is the same as the probability being able to deliver pro-
fessionally without practice is not limiting either. We can get the same results when
these probabilities differ. Having only two players is also for analytical convenience.
The intuition that there will be less competition if it is harder to achieve perfection
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would still be valid with more players, since when we have Cournot competition there
will be a non-linear reduction in profits as the number of competitors increase. Hence,
the two player case is the simplest possible scenario which captures the effect of dif-
ferent levels of competition. The assumption on the demand side of linearity again
only affect parameter values and have no qualitative impact.
The assumption is made that unless practising for perfection is successful relia-
bility will not be improved. This captures situations where failing despite practising
is an indication that the way the individual practices is not effective and therefore a
pure waste of time.
The assumption which deserve a more detailed comment is the discrete nature of
reliability of skills. The author has also solved the problem where the reliability is a
continuous choice variable, and derived conditions under which there will be a corner
solution. i.e. if she practices she will aim for perfection. Again we get in this case
a more complex model with the same qualitative results. Hence, it is the simplest
model which captures the qualitative results of more realistic and complex models of
the same problem.
Adding a bit of complexity could generate some additional insights by allowing
comparative statics for a larger set of parameter values, but would not change the
fundamental insight.
The model does reflect received wisdom by having an element of beginner’s luck,
i.e. you can get it right without practice, but you may fail completely if you try
again. Hence, the model describes a situation where practice is about making ones
skills more reliable rather than being able to do it at all. This feature gives rise to
a situation in which the very high standards that the perfectionist will aim for, will
prevent anyone else to attempt it unless they have achieved perfection as well even
though welfare would be higher if they did, i.e. the best is the enemy of the good.
Furthermore, it encapsulates a quote by Franz Liszt that genie oblige. Even though a
genius is guaranteed to achieve perfection if he aims for it, facing a higher probability
of being a genius will make the individual lazy and practice less. Unless the individual
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is told ’genie oblige’, e.g. if you can do it, you should do it, he may choose not to.
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